In multi-agent systems, most of the time, an agent does not have complete information about the preferences and decision making processes of other agents. This prevents even the co-operative agents from making coordinated choices, purely due to their ignorance of what others want. To overcome this problem, traditional coordination methods rely heavily on inter-agent communication, and thus become very ine cient when communication is costly or simply not desirable (e.g. to preserve privacy). In this paper, we propose the use of learning to complement communication in acquiring knowledge about other agents. We augment the communication-intensive negotiating agent architecture with a learning module, implemented as a Bayesian classi er. This allows our agents to incrementally update models of other agents' preferences from past negotiations with them. Based on these models, the agents can make sound predictions about others' preferences, thus reducing the need for communication in their future interactions.
1 Introduction about via applying some communicative act operators, typically formalised in the theory of speech-acts 27], 7].
Our on-going research goal is to design a generic architecture for negotiating agents. Motivated by the incomplete knowledge problem, we would like our agents to be less dependable on communication, yet still capable of achieving the same level of coordination. This can be done, as shown in this paper, by giving the agents the ability to learn and draw predictions about other agents' behaviours populated in the same environment.
In the negotiation domain, the importance of learning from previous experiences has been recognised in Sycara's work in the PERSUADER system 34]. PERSUADER is designed as the mediator for negotiations in the domain of labour relation. In this system, case-based reasoning techniques are used to reduce the communication overhead. Since negotiation is inherently a communication-centred task, learning cannot be a complete replacement for communication, as it has been shown possible in other simpler coordination tasks 30] .
Ideally, we would like to view both communication and learning as two complementary knowledge acquisition techniques, each with its own strengths and weaknesses. Communication is typically expensive in terms of time and resource and can become a bottleneck of the negotiation process. It also requires the agents' willingness to make private information available to others. However when one asks the right question and gets back the correct response, the information one gathers is certain. On the other hand, learning is performed locally by each individual agent and is thus less costly, however, the information acquired is mostly uncertain. The contrasting characteristics of the two knowledge acquisition methods make a hybrid approach an attractive alternative.
A formal framework that can provide utility theoretic comparisons between the use of communication and learning is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, we will restrict our goals here to reducing the communication overhead without sacri cing in terms of the degree of coordination. We also restrict our attention to cooperative and sincere agents. We propose a method for the agents to learn about other agents' characteristics via their past exchanges of messages. We provide a learning agent architecture that integrates a learning component into a reactive agent architecture in which the agents negotiate by rening a joint intention gradually until a common consensus is reached 4]. We also extend the simple instance averaging learning mechanism in 3] to a more general Bayesian classi cation mechanism based on which the learning component is implemented. Learning gives the agent the ability to draw predictions in uncertain situations, thus reducing the pressure for communication and improving the overall e ciency of the negotiation process. The approach is illustrated with examples from the distributed meeting scheduling domain 29] . The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we review related work in DAI, multi-agent learning and intelligent interfaces. Next we introduce the negotiation context which serves as the environment in which our agents interact. We then describe the mechanism for learning about other agents' preferences and show how it is integrated into the agent architecture. Finally we show our results in experimenting with the meeting scheduling agents and provide evaluations of the approach together with the future research directions.
Related background
In this section, we review brie y work in areas that are mostly related to the work presented in this paper. This including work in negotiation, learning in multi-agent system, and learning interfaces.
Negotiation and DAI
Negotiation has been the focus of many research e orts in both DPS and MAS. The contrasting characteristics of research into DPS and MAS are summarised in 13]. Brie y, DPS is concerned more with the design of the distributed system as a whole, and makes typical assumptions about the agents in the system such as being benevolent, having common goals, having common designer(s). On the contrary, MAS is concerned more with the design of the individual agents and how autonomous, self-motivated and even heterogeneous agents can function together in some open system. Our work has the characteristics of both a MAS and DPS approach. Our agents have their private utilities or preferences, however, they are assumed to be cooperative, and share the goal to maximise some group's or system's preference function. Furthermore, exchanges of preferences are to be minimised due to the private nature of preferences.
Work in DPS ( 5] , 33], 10]) represents the earliest use of negotiation for coordination. Cammarata 5] applies negotiation to the domain of distributed air-tra c control where planes involved in potential con icts modify their ying plans to avoid collision. In the contract net protocol proposed by Davis and Smith 10] , the problem of distributing tasks to a network of processing nodes is solved by negotiation via a simple task announcing and bidding mechanism. This negotiation mechanism is further extended in Durfee and Lesser's Partial Global Planning framework 12]. A more complex form of negotiation is present in the multi-stage negotiation protocol 9], 8]. Under this framework, negotiation is carried out in three phases: the asynchronous search phase in which the agents try to nd independent solutions, the coordinated search phase in which the agents coordinately search the solution space, and the over-constrained resolution phase in which some constraints are relaxed if all possible solutions failed in the previous phase. An overall view of the role of negotiation from a DPS perspective can be found in 21].
Closer to the MAS pole are Sycara's work on the PERSUADER system 34] and game theoretic approaches 40], 41], 20]. PERSUADER is an automated mediator in the domain of labour relations. In the presence of con icts, PERSUADER tries to achieve a solution by generating persuasive arguments to modify and bring closer together the belief and preference structures of the parties involved. The mediator also utilises past experiences using a case-based approach. Our work does not assume the role of a centralised mediator; rather negotiation is carried out by the participating agents themselves. Our work also di ers in the way past experiences are utilised: instead of storing and retrieving the past cases, our agents are able to keep and update models about other agents as information becomes available to them online.
Game theoretic approaches attempt to formalise negotiation as a game among rational agents whose objectives are to maximise their expected utilities. Krauss et al. 20] provides a model for bilateral negotiation in the domain of resource allocation. The model takes into account the delaying cost of each round of proposal exchanges. The work attempts to pre-compute equilibria solutions for some classes of negotiation contexts. These solutions then serve as the guidelines specifying the rational moves each negotiating agent should follow. Incomplete information is handled in the framework of incomplete games 17]. Whenever the agents have incomplete knowledge about other agents' characteristics or types, it is assumed that they associate a common prior probability distribution to other agents' types. One of the justi cations by Harsanyi 17] for this assumption is that the agents can acquire the objective types distribution through learning. This is in line with the work presented here: our agents can estimate the probability distributions of the other agents' characteristics (preference structures) with the help of the integrated learning module 1 .
Other approaches in formal modelling of agents' beliefs, desires, intentions 6], 37], 26] o er richer logic-based languages for speci cations of agents. However, attempts to formalise negotiation and come up with a generic negotiation architecture under this framework have proven to be quite complex and are yet to be fully addressed 37]. A rather complete review of the work done in this area can be found in 38] .
An approach to con ict resolutions that addresses the problem of preserving the privacy of the parties involved is 16]. The agents in resolving con icts in telecommunication systems can use goal recognition technique to guess the other agents' goals, thus can avoid communicating the goals explicitly. This resembles a similar idea of guessing instead of acquiring information directly in order not to expose too much private information.
Multiagent learning and learning interface agents
Driven by the costs and problems associated with communication, a growing body of research in applying learning to multi-agent systems 28], 35] suggests learning as an alternative knowledge acquisition method. Among the rst to explicitly address the issue of learning in DAI is the work by Shaw and Whinston 32] on an adaptive announcing and bidding mechanism for the contract net protocol. Another learning extension to the contract net framework to reduce communication is found in 11].
Work by several authors has applied learning to the problem of coordination. This approach di ers from communication-based approach to coordination in which messages are exchanged towards establishing a common commitment to a particular solution. Goldman and Rosenchein 15] propose a system in which the agents nd the solution to coordina-tion problems by learning from, and acting as teachers to other agents in the system. While this approach requires a separate learning and training phase, our work attempts to fuse learning into the normal activities of the agents. Another approach to coordination involves the use of reinforcement learning 2], 36], 31], 30]. Under this approach, coordination is achieved by reinforcing useful and relevant actions, or group of actions through an external rewarding mechanism.
Work in the area of intelligent interface agents has also applied learning to acquire the users' patterns of behaviours 19], 24], 23]. In our work, we do not address the problem of learning directly from the users, and are concerned only with the interactions among the set of surrogate agents. 3 The negotiation context
De nitions
We use the term negotiation context to refer to situations where a group of agents are trying to achieve a common agreement among a set of possible agreements. Each agent has di erent preferences towards an agreement that should be chosen. These and some other related concepts are de ned as follows: We assume that the agents' preferences are private information: the agents do not have knowledge about others' preferences at the onset of the negotiation, and might not be willing to share this information due to its privacy. Further assumptions about the cost of communication also restrict the number of exchanges of preferences among the agents. Negotiation contexts satisfying these assumptions are termed negotiation context with incomplete information. One can think of the preference of an agent A for some agreement d 2 D as the payo A would get if d is chosen as the nal agreement. We assume that the payo s are interchangeable, and the group's preference function is taken as the sum of all private preference functions. From a system's point of view, this is the measurement of how well the system as a whole performs. The agents are cooperative if they are to maximise this group's preference function. Subsequently, we restrict the scope of negotiation contexts considered here to those with incomplete information and cooperative agents.
The negotiation process
In a negotiation context < A; D; f >, the agents in A initially attempt to nd an agreement within the set of all possible agreements D. Thus, D is termed the initial joint agreement set of the agents. More generally, let D be a subset containing some agreements. is termed the current joint agreement set if all the agents currently attempt to nd an agreement within . Negotiation can be viewed as a process in which the agents re ne their joint agreement set from the initial joint agreement set D to a nal joint agreement set containing only a single agreement. The incremental behaviour of the negotiation process is guided by an agreement tree de ned as a tree structure whose nodes are agreement sets with the following properties:
(1) the root node is D, (2) all the leaf nodes are singleton sets, and (3) the set of all children of a node is a partition of that node. Negotiation is a coordinated search through the tree to nd a leaf (agreement) acceptable by all the agents. The search may involve many iterations and in each iteration the agents have to go through the following stages:
Asynchronous re nement : In this stage, each agent independently chooses its individual re nement for the current joint agreement set. The re nement is chosen to maximise some particular agent's re nement bias function. The selected re nements are then sent to other agents in the form of proposals. An agent is also allowed to prune a branch of the tree if its averaged preference for that branch falls below a certain threshold.
Which actual re nement bias function being used is therefore the determining factor of the negotiating behaviour of the agent and crucial to the performance of the group.
For example, if agent A's re nement bias function is taken as f A , A's behaviour will be sel sh since it only tries to maximise its own preference. More cooperative re nement bias functions can be constructed which depend not only on A's own preference but also on A's information about others' preferences. The comparison between di erent re nement bias functions is the main focus of the remaining of the paper and will be discussed in more details in the subsequent sections.
Collective re nement : If all the proposals in the previous stage agree to the same re nement, the agents adopt this re nement as their new joint agreement set. Otherwise, a con ict resolution phase is entered in which the agents exchange their preferences and attempt to nd a re nement that maximises the group's preference. In the collective re nement stage, if all individual re nements agree, this re nement becomes the new joint agreement set of the agents. Otherwise, the di erences in the individual re nements are resolved through further communication between the agents in three steps: (1) each agent collects other agents' preferences of its own re nement; (2) each agent calculates the group's preference for its re nement and uses this preference as a new ranking value for its own re nement; and (3) the agents choose a winner among themselves on the basis of maximal ranking value (to assure a clear winner, a small random perturbation can be added to the ranking value in step 2). Subsequently, the winner's re nement is adopted by the whole group of agents.
At the end of the k-th iteration, all the agents in the group should form a new joint agreement set k+1 k or decide that the agreement set k is over-constrained and backtrack to k?1 . The iterative negotiation process ends when either an agreement set s = fdg at the leaf level is reached, or 1 = D is over-constrained itself. In the former case, a solution is found whereas in the latter case, the negotiation is regarded as failing.
Problems with incomplete knowledge
Crucial to the performance of the above negotiation protocol is the re nement bias used by the agents in choosing the re nement of an agreement set. Since the agents are to maximise the group's preference function F, ideally, they can take their bias functions to be F itself.
Given that an agent A's preference value for a re nement choice is f A ( ), the group's preference for is F( ) = P A2A f A ( ). In the ideal case where every agent uses F( ) to select a re nement, all individual re nements and intentions will be the same, hence a new agreement set can be formed immediately without further complication.
It is easy to see why the ideal case may not happen by rewriting F( ) as F( ) = f A ( ) + F A ( ) where F A ( ) is the preference of the agents other than A. Here, the component F A ( ) is not readily available to A since it requires knowledge about other agents' preference functions.
In situations where the other agents are eager to reveal their preference functions, A can directly ask other agents about their preferences (the communication approach).
This would require additional communication and may not be feasible in circumstances where exposure of individual preference is not desirable. If asking others is costly, the agents can choose the re nement by maximising only their own preferences (the ignorance approach). However, this approach usually leads to diverging and con icting individual intentions and requires a lengthy con ict resolution stage. Above are the two extreme approaches to the problem of incomplete knowledge. In the next section, we describe the learning approach in which the agents use the expected value of the group's preference function as their re nement biases. Through the use of learning, this expected value can be computed based on the agents' past experiences in dealing with other agents.
Learning other agents' preferences
We propose the use of learning as an alternative knowledge acquisition method to counter the problem of incomplete knowledge. If it is not desirable to acquire the knowledge from asking questions directly, why not learn to predict what the answers would be? Furthermore, in our negotiation context, making a false prediction will not result in a catastrophe (the worst situation is when extra exchange of messages is needed). With a mechanism to make reasonably good predictions about other agents' preferences, we are likely to improve the e ciency of the whole negotiation process.
Overall

Learning data
A negotiating agent throughout its lifetime will participate in a potentially large number of di erent negotiation contexts. Although each negotiation context has a di erent set of participating members, closely a liated agents are likely to engage in the same negotiation context more often. Furthermore, the domains of these negotiation contexts are usually subsets of a common domain D . For example, in resource allocation, the set of resources to be allocated might be di erent from one negotiation to another, however, they are usually drawn out of one common set of resources frequently shared by the agents. In meeting scheduling, the time windows for the meetings to be scheduled are di erent, however, again, they are subsets of one common time line.
An agent has the opportunities to acquire sample data about others' preference functions via the number of exchanges of preferences taking place in previous negotiation 
Properties of the learning task
This problem can be viewed as a supervised learning task in which f B (d) acts as the class for the point d in the sample/feature space D . Furthermore, since we want to have learning as an extra built-in capability for the agents in performing their normal activities, the problem at hand is also an online learning task.
Learning mechanism
Online learning tasks are best suited to some form of incremental learning to avoid storing the ever growing, full accumulated sample set and keep updating time to a minimum. We have experimented with one form of incremental learning, the instance-averaging mechanism, in our previous work 3]. However, the mechanism has several short comings, among which is the inability to learn complex patterns that might exist in other agents' preference functions. To over come this, the (naive) Bayesian classi ers are used here as the underlying learning mechanism. In the rest of this section, we assume that an agent 
Bayesian classi ers
Bayesian classi er is a probabilistic learning algorithm where the Bayes' theorem is used to induce probabilistic class descriptions for a given sample 22]. Its formulation consists of a set of classes C = fc i g, and a set of observable features E = fE j g where each feature E j can take on some values fe jk g. Given a sample whose observation yields e = (e 1k 1 ; e 2k 2 ; : : : ; e mkm ), the probability of that sample belonging to a class c i is: P(c i je) = P(ejc i )P(c i )
P(e) (1) If we assume that the features E i are statistically independent given information about the class, (1) can be rewritten as: P(c i je) = ( Q j P(e jk j jc i ))P(c i ) N (2) where N is a normalisation constant. By keeping a counter r ijk of the number of previous samples that belong to class c i and have the value e jk for feature E j for all i; j; k, the remaining factors from the RHS of equation (2) can be approximated using the following formulae:
P(e jk j jc i ) = r ijk j P j;k r ijk (3) P(c i ) = P j;k r ijk P i;j;k r ijk (4) The basic learning algorithm with a Bayesian classi er works by updating the corresponding counters r ijk when presented with a training sample. To classify a sample e, the set of formulae above can be used to estimate the posterior probability P(c i je), e.g. the probability of e belongs to a class c i for all i.
Learning the preferences
The rst step in applying Bayesian classi cation method to our learning task is to deter- 
Generally, for an arbitrary number of agents in the group, the re nement bias function used by the learning agent A in evaluating its re nement choices is given by:
where f est is the mean of f est d for d 2 .
From A's point of view, F est A is the expected value of the group's preference function F. The learning mechanism involves incrementally updating the function F est A when new data is available. To incorporate learning into the negotiation scheme, instead of using the usual function f A ( ) to evaluate A's re nement choices, the new function F est A is used.
Since F est
A includes the pattern of other agents' preferences, it can facilitate A and other learning agents in making better coordinated decisions.
Implementation and evaluation
In this section, we present our results of applying the proposed learning agent framework to the distributed meeting scheduling problem.
The distributed meeting scheduling domain
We chose the distributed meeting scheduling domain 29] as a test-bed for the performance of the learning agents. In distributed meeting scheduling, the agents are the managers of the users' personal schedules. In a typical meeting scheduling situation, given a timewindow, a group of agents have to decide on a common slot within the given timewindow as their agreed meeting time. Meanwhile, each member of the group has di erent preferences of what the desired slot should be and no agent has complete information about other agents' preferences. The problem is further complicated by the requirement to preserve the privacy of the personal schedules. This makes it desirable to reduce the amount of exchanges of preferences among the group of agents. A single meeting scheduling scenario involves a set of participating agents, a time window (W), the duration for the meeting being scheduled (l), and for each agent A a set of existing appointments (App A = fapp i g) such that 8i 6 = j; app i \ app j = ;. ?cost(app) (8) The domain of all negotiation contexts D becomes the time-line itself D = Time.
In choosing the features for the Bayesian classi cation, we partition Time into periodic intervals along several dimensions such as hour of the day (daily period), odd/even day (bi-daily period), day of the week (weekly period), week of the month (monthly period), etc. A su ciently rich partition can capture most of the periodicity that is present in the agents' preference functions. 
Implementation
We have implemented the prototype meeting scheduling agents in Dynaclips 3.1/Clips 6.0 running under SunOS operating system. Each agent is a Clips program consisting of a set of knowledge sources or rules acting on a blackboard-based memory. The rule sets (represented by shaded boxes) and the partitions of the memory (represented by white boxes) are depicted in gure 2. Arrows coming from a memory partition into a rule set indicate the activations of rules. Arrows coming from a rule set into a memory partition indicate the assertions and deletions of facts in memory. The agents communicate via sending and receiving KQML messages 14]. Upon receiving a message, information about other agents' belief, intentions and preferences are updated accordingly. The learning module is implemented as an add-on rule set keeping other parts of the architecture untouched. The agents can be invoked with or without this learning component. From messages received from other agents, the learning module constructs the statistical models used to calculate the expected value of others' preferences. Based on this, the expected value of the group preference F can be derived and used in guiding the re nement of the agents' agreement set. In order to evaluate the bene ts of the learning agents, we compare their performance with two other non-learning approaches: communication and ignorance. The communication approach uses F as the re nement bias functions for all the agents. In each re nement iteration, the approach requires the full exchange of information about the agents' preferences in the asynchronous re nement stage. Let h be the number of possible re nements of the current joint agreement set. Since each agent needs to know the preferences of (n ? 1) other agents for h possible re nements, the number of messages needed is O(hn(n ? 1)). However, since the agents' individual re nements would have already converged after this stage, there is no need for further exchange of preferences in the collective re nement stage.
The ignorance approach uses f A as the re nement bias for agent A, while the learning approach uses F est A . Both the ignorance and learning approaches do not require communication in the asynchronous re nement stage, however communication is required in the collective re nement stage to resolve the con icts among the agents' individual re nements. Let g be the number of di erent individual re nements after the asynchronous re nement stage (note that g minfh; ng). In the collective re nement stage, since the agents would have to exchange the preferences to compute the winning re nement, the number of preference exchange messages would be O(gn(n ? 1)). Figure 3: The domain D and its tree structure on the comparison between the ignorance and the learning approach. Intuitively, since the learning agents have more mutual understanding, they are more coordinated than the ignorant agents in making their individual re nements, and can achieve the same level of utility for the outcome of the negotiation, but with a less number of messages in the con ict resolution stages. In the next section, we provide experimental results to backup this claim.
Experiments
We model the time-line as a set of discrete points 30 minutes apart. Every day, the agents have to schedule a meeting with the duration of 2 units and within the timewindow 8h,16h30]. The possible agreement set D with its tree structure is shown in gure 3. The agents' preferences have a mixture of daily, bi-daily, and weekly periods. Noise can be added to the preference functions and this is interpreted as new non-periodic appointments, or the cancellation of existing periodic appointments. The number of participating agents is 2 for the rst experiment and 3 for the second.
In each experiment, we run the agents with and without the learning module, and compare the group utilities of the nal agreements and the number of messages needed for reaching the agreements in each case. For the learning agents, we also record the averaged prediction errors and the entropy of the learned probabilities. Figures 4 and 5 show the results of the two experiments. The graphs plot the number of messages, the agreement cost (negation of the utility), the prediction error and the Figure 4 : The 2-agent experiment entropy of the current learned probabilities for each day. In both cases, the learning agents reach the nal agreements with equivalent utilities, however, taking smaller number of messages. This is more apparent in the 3-agent experiment since the con icting potential for the non-learning agents is higher. Also, in both cases, the learning agents are able to make better predictions and with less uncertainty as they become more experienced over time.
Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a method to incorporate a learning component into the negotiating agent architecture. We use the Bayesian classi cation technique as our underlying learning mechanism. This gives the agents the ability to induce complex patterns about other agents' preferences from the interactions during their past negotiations.
With the knowledge learned, the experienced agents are able to make better coordinated decisions in the future negotiations with their peers, thus improving the performance of the system over time. This illustrates that learning techniques can be used as an alternative knowledge acquisition to complement direct querying in negotiation. Although not designed to replace direct queries, the ability to complement direct queries with learning can be useful when communication costs are high, or when high level of inter-agent communication is not desirable (e.g. to preserve individual privacy). The work presented here can be extended along several directions. More sophisticated domains might require more complex learning mechanisms to improve the prediction accuracy. For example, learning techniques for Bayesian networks 18] can be used to incorporate features that are not statistically independent. Such extensions to the learning module can provide better estimations of the probabilities, however, the trade o will be the need for more training samples, and the sacri cing of doing learning incrementally. Our approach is also applicable to the situation where there are a large number of agents and when the group of interacting agents are formed dynamically. More extensive experiments can be carried out to determine the bene ts of learning in this more complicated setting. Last but not least, to evaluate the bene ts of learning to its full extent, it is necessary to develop a common framework in which the uncertainty of learned knowledge and the cost of communication can be examined together.
